This paper studies a continuous-time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric Brownian motion firm size. The changing firm size generates partial incentives, analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff. When the agent is as patient as investors, performance-based stock grants implement the optimal contract. Our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns, and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms. That the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the CEO's historical performance-rather than current performance-lends support to our model. (JEL G32, D82, E2) This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation by studying a continuoustime moral hazard problem. The existing continuous-time agency models typically employ the less-appealing arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) framework that essentially entails a constant firm size. However, the relevance of firm size in the context of agency problems is widely documented.
This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation by studying a continuoustime moral hazard problem. The existing continuous-time agency models typically employ the less-appealing arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM) framework that essentially entails a constant firm size. However, the relevance of firm size in the context of agency problems is widely documented.
1 Our model represents a significant departure from the previous literature in that we allow firm size to be time-varying and follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). We address the following questions: (i) Does time-varying firm size affect incentive provisions in the optimal contract? (ii) Is the optimal contract under this environment different from the one under the ABM setting? and (iii) How can the resulting optimal contract be implemented?
A large literature studies dynamic contracting under moral hazard. Formally introduced in Spear and Srivastava (1987) , the agent's continuation payoff has been acknowledged as a powerful tool to serve as the state variable in dynamic programming. However, this literature is reluctant to bring in another state variable to capture the time-varying technology, largely for the sake of tractability. For instance, typical continuous-time moral hazard models assume an ABM output process (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; and Sannikov, 2006a) . A divergence exists between this specification and the one employed in the standard finance literature (see, among others, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001) . By adopting the GBM framework, this paper makes the first attempt to bridge the gap between the continuous-time agency model and the conventional continuous-time finance literature.
In our model, investors hire an agent for business operation. The firm size process follows a GBM, and the agent controls firm size growth through unobservable effort. In contrast, the existing literature (DeMarzo and Sannikov, 2006, DS; Biais et al., 2007, BMPR; DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007, DF) focuses on the setting with constant firm size, in which the agent controls the drift of instantaneous ABM cash flows.
2 Later we refer to these models as ABM, as opposed to our GBM model. Relative to the existing literature, this paper highlights how changing firm size affects the agency problem.
In addition, in the ABM models the cash flows are unbounded from below. Consequently, substantial losses can arise during any time interval and, therefore, the agent is always constrained. However, the GBM model has positive cash flows, and we show that in the optimal contract there are absorbing states in which the constraint disappears and the first-best outcome is achieved (see Section 2.3.2). These first-best absorbing states are attained when the agent has a long history of successes, or equivalently, when the firm has experienced rapid growth. Both the role of firm size, and the possibility that the agency issue may be resolved along the optimal path, are realistic features that are present in discrete-time models, but not in the existing continuous-time literature. Our modeling thus advances the continuous-time optimal contracting literature in important ways.
The key tradeoffs in this type of setting (DF, DS, BMPR, and this paper) are as follows. Implementing high effort requires sufficient incentives, which mandate that poor results be met with penalties. As the agent's limited liability precludes negative wages, these penalties will accumulate until inefficient termination is triggered. This implies that incentive provision is potentially costly, and hence the optimal contract provides just enough incentives to induce the agent to exert effort.
Different from ABM models, the time-varying firm size in our GBM setting generates a portion of incentives through the agent's continuation payoff. Intuitively, this mechanism works as if investors grant the agent a number of equity shares according to her current continuation payoff, and this hypothetical inside 2 DF study a discrete-time model; DS study a continuous-time model; and BMPR solve the discrete-time model first, then take the result to the continuous-time limit. In their main models, all three papers study the problem in which the agent can secretly divert cash from the current output for her own consumption. Under the ABM setup, the cash-diverting problem is isomorphic to the standard moral hazard problem with binary effort and binary outcome. In our GBM model, since cash flows are predetermined, there is no such equivalence. However, our model is equivalent to the agency problem in which the agent can "steal" the firm's assets (secretly sell part of the firm's plants and pocket the sale proceeds).
stake provides some incentives for the agent when the firm size is changing (see discussion in Section 2.3.3). However, along the optimal path, these incentives are not sufficient to motivate the agent. Therefore, additional incentives are provided in the optimal contract (e.g., through future performance-based stock grants).
Other than the tradeoff between incentive provision and inefficient termination, there is a wedge between two contracting parties: the agent is, at most, as patient as investors. Therefore, exchanging relative consumption timings between these two parties improves efficiency, and the optimal contract pays cash (wage) to the agent as early as possible. However, paying cash earlier to the agent, or setting a lower payment boundary in the employment contract, is potentially costly. The reason is that by reducing the agent's continuation payoff, this might make future inefficient liquidation more likely. As a result, the optimal contract calls for investors to set the optimal cash payment boundary such that the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Consistent with DS and BMPR, for the case of a strictly impatient agent where the marginal benefit of paying cash earlier is positive, the payment threshold is a reflecting barrier, and a positive marginal cost of paying cash earlier is maintained.
The novel result in this paper pertains to the case of an equally patient agent under the continuous-time framework. When the agent is equally patient, most discrete-time long-term agency models derive an optimal contract with a first-best absorbing state, as agency issue will be completely resolved when the agent's stake within the contractual relationship becomes sufficiently high (see DF, BMPR, and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004) . However, in the continuous-time ABM setting (DS and BMPR), unbounded cash flows imply that future inefficient liquidation is always possible, and the first-best state obtained in the discrete-time model (DF and BMPR) disappears. In fact, because an earlier cash payment has zero marginal benefit due to the irrelevance of relative consumption timings, while the marginal cost brought on by future termination is always positive, in the ABM model DS and BMPR find that investors should delay the agent's wage indefinitely to minimize the probability of inefficient liquidation. Consequently, when the agent is as patient as investors, the optimal contract fails to exist in their ABM models (see Section 2.3.2).
In contrast, we derive an optimal contract for the equally patient agent case in our GBM model. When the agent's continuation payoff is sufficiently high, she is granted certain equity shares and works forever in the firm; and in this situation the positive cash flows in the GBM model preclude future inefficient liquidation. Therefore, our GBM setting recovers the interesting absorbing firstbest state, but with a mechanism that is distinct from the discrete-time setup studied in DF or BMPR. Furthermore, in this equally patient agent case, we derive a new optimal contract even when it is suboptimal to implement working all the time. Under the latter contract, shirking becomes another absorbing state. This extends the results in DS, who study only the case of an impatient agent.
Our optimal contract can be implemented through a performance-based compensation scheme: Incentive Points Plan. Under this plan, the points trace the agent's scaled (by firm size) continuation payoff, and the agent can redeem those points above a prespecified threshold. Interestingly, in the case of equally patient agents, this plan corresponds to performance-based stock grants: once the agent has accumulated enough points, she can convert them to a prescribed number of equity shares. This implementation resembles "performance shares" that are currently used in most long-term incentive plans (see, among others, Frydman and Saks, 2005) . 3 We discuss several interesting implications of our results. Larger firms that experience a better performance history suffer less severe agency problems. And, equity returns exhibit rising volatility when the firm's performance is poor. This "leverage" effect caused by agency problem is more compelling than the one obtained in BMPR, because in their ABM framework, a constant volatility in levels could lead to a leverage effect for returns, even without the agency problem. Using simulation, we contend that research on CEO pay-performance sensitivity should consider long-term incentives when analyzing executives' remuneration contracts. Empirical evidence that shows that for stock and option grants CEOs are primarily compensated based on their historical achievements rather than their current performance lends support to this paper.
The related literature on long-term agency models includes Sannikov (2006a) , who considers an ABM environment with an equally patient riskaverse agent, and allows for a continuum of effort levels from the agent. There, the optimal contract features an upper absorbing retirement state without working, while, here, we find an upper absorbing state where the agent works voluntarily forever.
4 Williams (2006) develops a general theory about the principal-agent model that accommodates both hidden actions and hidden states. Tchistyi (2005) extends DF by allowing for correlated cash flows, and Sannikov (2006b) studies a mixture of moral hazard and adverse selection problem.
The theory of optimal dynamic lending contracts (Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Hart and Moore, 1994; and Thomas and Worrall, 1994, etc.) is also related. This strand of literature focuses on the dynamic borrowing constraints caused by the possibility of strategic default from the borrower, 5 and there is no interperiod agency problem as modeled in DF or BMPR. For instance, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) relate the borrowing constraint to the endogenous equity value (the borrower's continuation payoff). 6 We present the model in Section 1, and characterize the optimal contract in Section 2. Section 3 considers the model's extensions. Section 4 discusses implementations and implications, including an empirical study about longterm grant-performance sensitivity. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Our basic framework is a continuous-time principal-agent model, in which risk-neutral investors of an infinitely lived firm hire a risk-neutral agent to operate the business. The firm produces cash flow δ t per unit of time, which evolves according to a GBM
where Z = {Z t , F t ; 0 ≤ t < ∞} is a standard Brownian motion on a complete probability space ( , F, P) , and a t ∈ {0, µ} is the agent's binary effort choice. Here, a t = µ > 0 stands for "working," while a t = 0 stands for "shirking." Investors discount future cash flows at the market interest rate r > µ > 0. Note that if the agent works all the time, then from the view of investors, the firm's first-best value at time t is E t ∞ t e −r (s−t) δ s ds = 1 r −µ δ t , which follows a GBM process as well.
We interpret the cash flow rate δ t -which is proportional to the firm's firstbest value-as the current firm size. Firm size process {δ} is observable and contractible, while the agent's effort choice a t is not. The agent derives a positive nonpecuniary private benefit φδ t dt from shirking, where φ is a positive constant. This benefit is proportional to the current firm size, because administering a larger firm requires more effort.
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The agent has no initial wealth, and negative wage is ruled out by limited liability. We assume that the agent's reservation value is zero, which ensures 6 Based on Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , there is another active area on the continuous-time contracting problem where CARA utility and ABM processes are usually assumed (e.g., Ou-Yang (2005) with a constant volatility). Their framework differs fundamentally from that of this paper: instead of allowing for interim consumption and endogenous termination, the authors assume a lump-sum payment at the end of an exogenous employment horizon [0, T ]. More importantly, in contrast to limited liability imposed in this paper where the negative wage is ruled out, that framework allows for a two-way transfer between the principal and the agent. See He (2007) who embeds the CARA agency model into the GBM framework to study the agency impact on the firm's capital structure decision. 7 The shirking benefit (available only when the agent is hired in the firm) can be interpreted as the negation of the agent's effort cost. Note that this assumption is also consistent with the notion that the agent's private benefit is increasing with the firm size.
the scale invariance property of the model. 8, 9 The agent has a discount rate γ ≥ r -that is, the agent is (weakly) less patient than investors. Note that the ABM model in DS or BMPR requires γ > r strictly.
Agent's employment starts at t = 0, and is terminated when the firm is liquidated. At the time of liquidation, investors recover a value Lδ t from the firm's assets, and fire the agent. We assume that L < 1 r −µ ; that is, liquidation is inefficient. Later, we endogenize L by allowing the firm to replace the incumbent agent with a new identical agent (see Section 3.1).
Assume that investors can commit to an employment contract that specifies an endogenous stochastic liquidation time τ, and a right-continuous-left-limit nondecreasing cumulative wage process {U } = {U t : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ}. We denote such a contract by ≡ {{U } , τ}, where both elements are δ-measurable, and τ could take the value ∞. We impose the usual square-integrable condition on as follows:
A contract is incentive-compatible if it motivates the agent to work until liquidation; in other words, if a * t = µ : 0 ≤ t < τ solves the following agent's problem:
where E a [·] is the expectation operator under the probability measure over {δ} that is induced by any effort process a = {a t ∈ {0, µ} : 0 ≤ t < τ}. We assume that it is optimal to implement working all the time, and verify its optimality in Section 3.2. Therefore in this paper, unless otherwise stated, the expectation operator is under the measure induced by {a t = µ : 0 ≤ t < τ}.
Throughout, we assume that the firm possesses full bargaining power. Denote the set of incentive-compatible contracts as IC, and the firm's problem is
There is no agent's participation constraint in this problem, as the agent enjoys a positive rent once she is hired. Denote the solution for this problem as * = {{U * } , τ * }.
Model Solution and Optimal Contracting

Continuation payoff and incentive compatibility
This section gives a key proposition for any incentive-compatible contract ∈ IC. Fix the effort process a = {a t = µ : 0 ≤ t < τ}. For any contract , define the agent's continuation payoff at time t, as
In words, W t is the agent's continuation value obtained under when she plans to work from t onward.
, which relates to the minimum incentive required to motivate the agent.
10 Based on Martingale Representation Theorem, the following proposition expresses the evolution of W t in terms of observable performance δ t , and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for any contract to be incentive-compatible. 
The contract ∈ IC, i.e., is incentive-compatible, if and only if σ
Proposition 1 states that the agent's instantaneous compensation-the wage (dU t ) plus the change of continuation payoff (dW t )-has a predetermined drift part γW t dt that corresponds to the Promise-Keeping condition in the discretetime formulation, and a diffusion part
which links to her effort choice and provides working incentive. To motivate the agent, the instantaneous volatility of continuation payoff, δ t σ W t , must be higher than λσδ t . To see this, if the agent chooses to shirk, she gains a private
Figure 1
The optimal cash (wage) payment and incentive provision policy There exists a positive constant k ≤ λ, so that it is optimal to pay the agent cash W t − kδ t once W t > kδ t . The incentive compatibility constraint requires a slope λ for the local movement of (δ t , W t ) = (δ t , kδ t ), while the agent's hypothetical inside stake contributes only a slope k < λ due to the diffusion of δ. Consequently, the optimal contract provides additional incentives to fulfill the slope discrepancy λ − k (see discussion in Section 2.3.3).
benefit φδ t dt, but loses
dt in compensation (dδ t becomes driftless under shirking). Thus, she will work if and only if
Therefore, by putting her at risk, the volatility of dW t + dU t pushes the agent to exert high effort. In other words, for enough punishing and rewarding, the volatility of the agent's continuation payoff must exceed a certain threshold λσδ t .
As we will see shortly, in the optimal contract we have σ W t = λσ; that is, the incentive compatibility constraint always binds. Geometrically, on the (δ, W ) plot in Figure 1 , the (local) movement of the state-variable pair (δ, W ) (which is determined by the diffusion term) must be as steep as λ. The investors' value function b (δ, W ) ∈ C 2 (i.e., twice differentiable in both arguments) is the firm's highest expected future profit, given these two state variables. When the agent works all the time, the firm size δ t evolves as
And the agent's continuation payoff W t follows,
11 In the optimal contract, dW t has a diffusion term λσδ t d Z t . Therefore
As we will verify in Section 2.4, the concavity of the investors' value function implies that the optimal contract provides just enough incentives; i.e., σ W t = λσ. Also, similar to DS, the optimal cash (wage) payment policy depends on
> −1, then promising one dollar of continuation payoff to the agent costs the firm less than paying one dollar cash. As a result, in this case the firm should hold the cash and promise to pay later.
The tractability of our GBM model hinges on the scale invariance property, which implies that the optimal policy is homogeneous in firm size δ t .
12 As a result, the investors' value function b(δ, W ) must be of the form δc(k), where the agent's scaled continuation payoff k ≡ W/δ is the only relevant state variable, and c(·) ∈ C 2 is a univariate smooth function. We call c(·) the investors' scaled value function.
In the Appendix, after writing down the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we find that c (·) must solve the following second-order ordinary differential equation (ODE) when there is no cash payment (dU = 0):
This equation plays a key role in analyzing the optimal contract; we call it the Optimality Equation.
The optimality of cash payment yields two boundary conditions at the upper end. Scale invariance implies that the optimal cash payment barrier W t is linear in δ-i.e., W t ≡ kδ t , where k is a positive constant to be solved in the optimal contract. Once W t sits above W t , investors will pay the agent W t − W t in cash to bring W t back to W t (see Figure 1) . Because paying the agent cash to reduce her continuation payoff W is a barrier control with linear cost, we have the Smooth-Pasting condition ∂b ∂ W δ t , kδ t = −1, and the Super-Contact condition Dixit, 1993) . In terms of c (·), the conditions are
Applying these two conditions to Equation (4), we find that at k, c(·) attaches the function
k with slope −1. We extend c(·) linearly (with slope −1) for k > k based on the optimal wage policy (see Figure 2) .
Termination delivers another boundary condition at the lower end. Let τ be the first hitting time at which W t = 0. Once this occurs, the agent is fired, and investors liquidate the firm for a surrender value Lδ τ . Hence,
and c (·) solves Equation (4) with boundary conditions (5), (6), and (7).
Figure 2
The scaled value function c(·) for the case γ > r (an impatient agent)
r −µ k with a slope −1, and is extended for k > k with a slope −1.
In light of the Feynman-Kac formula, c (k) can be written in its probabilistic representation (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix)
where the process {k} evolves according to
and u t is a nondecreasing process that reflects k t at k. 14 Intuitively, the scaled value function c (k) equals expected scaled cash flows 1dt, plus the scaled liquidation value L, minus scaled wages, all discounted by the effective discount rate r − µ.
We define the first-best scaled value function 
Comparison to ABM setting in DS and BMPR.
As a comparison, under the ABM setting analyzed in DS and BMPR, the agent controls the instantaneous cash flow dY t , which can be written as (when the agent is working)
In contrast, in the GBM model, the agent controls the change of firm size (cashflow rate) dδ t , rather than the predetermined cash flow δ t dt. This distinction necessarily leads to different implementation mechanisms in Section 4.1. Also, in the GBM model the cash flow δ t dt is positive, but in the ABM setting dY t is unbounded from below. As we will see later, this divergence affects the existence of the first-best state in optimal contracting. In the ABM model, once the agent (with a reservation utility R) shirks to enjoy the private benefit φdt, the drift of dY t drops to 0. As before, define λ = φ/µ. Similar arguments as in Section 2.1 imply that the state variable, which is the agent's continuation payoff W (as opposed to k = W/δ in our GBM model), evolves according to
Denote W as the payment boundary in the optimal contract. When W ∈ [R, W ], cash payment dU = 0, and the unidimensional value function b (W ) satisfies
with similar boundary conditions
The optimal contract pays out cash dU t > 0 only when W t exceeds the reflecting barrier W . When W τ = R, the firm is liquidated. Comparing Equation (4) to Equation (10), we immediately discern a difference: because in the GBM setup the drift captures the firm's growth, the parameter µ enters Equation (4) by reducing both parties' discount rates. The key difference, however, lies in the second-order term in these two equations: in Equation (4), the coefficient of the second-order term is (λ − k t )σ, while in Equation (10) it is λσ. Because the second-order term corresponds to the diffusion part of respective state variables, and the diffusion in turn captures incentives, two important implications ensue. First, note that according to Equation (1), the required incentives are λσ, while only the (λ − k t )σ portion of incentives would lead to future inefficient liquidation-it is the diffusion that causes k t to hit the liquidation boundary 0. This fact suggests that in the GBM model, the scaled continuation payoff k t itself generates some "costless" incentives along the optimal path. In Section 2.3.3, we will see that this finding stems from the time-varying firm size in our GBM setting.
Second, this state-dependent diffusion (λ − k t )σ in Equation (4) leads to one significant result that contrasts drastically with the ABM model. Unlike Equation (10), Equation (4) involves a singular point (when k t = λ, the diffusion of k t dies), which corresponds to the absorbing state in which a sufficiently high inside stake drives the agent to work voluntarily (see Section 2.3.2). In fact, Section 2.3.2 shows that when the agent is equally patient, this absorbing state, as a part of the optimal contract, achieves the first-best result.
The optimal contract
Consistent with BMPR, we find that the optimal contract differs for the two cases γ > r and γ = r . As we discussed in the introductory section, postponing the agent's consumption alleviates the agency problem, and thereby improves efficiency. However, if the agent is impatient, then postponing consumption will entail a cost, as the first-best result has the agent consume as early as possible. In contrast, for an equally patient agent, the payment delay is absolutely free. Therefore, whether the cost is present or not determines the structure of optimal contract.
When γ > r (impatient agent).
If the agent is impatient, earlier wage payments tend to be optimal, and the optimal payment boundary k is always below λ (see Figure 2) , as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. When γ > r , we have k < λ. There exists a unique solution c (·) to Equation (4) with boundary conditions (5), (6), and (7), and the solution is strictly concave on [0, k].
Our resulting optimal contract can be described as follows. At t = 0, the firm hires an agent by offering her a continuation payoff W 0 = k * δ 0 , and promises the evolution of her continuation payoff W t to be
When W t achieves kδ t , investors start paying the agent cash to maintain her continuation payoff W t at kδ t . When W hits zero at time τ, investors fire the agent and liquidate the firm. This optimal contract is quite similar to that of DS and BMPR, except that the cash payment threshold kδ t is state-dependent, with an upper bound λδ t . In addition, the result of k < λ implies a nondying diffusion of k t , which suggests that along the optimal path, it is always possible to have k t drop to zero if the agent's future performance is poor. This result is due to the gap between the two parties' patience levels. To see this, first note that the agent's impatience implies a strictly positive marginal benefit of paying cash to the agent earlier, or setting a lower payment threshold k. However, in the Appendix (Lemma 4, part 3), we show that the marginal cost of setting a lower payment boundary (brought on by future inefficient liquidation) is zero at the absorbing state λ, and positive for k < λ. To equate the marginal cost with the marginal benefit, the firm should pay the agent cash before k t reaches λ. This tradeoff never exists for an equally patient agent, as we will discuss in the next section.
When γ = r (equally patient agent).
When the issue of relative consumption timing is absent, postponing cash payments has zero cost. As a result, k = λ is the optimal payment boundary, which is higher than the one obtained when γ > r (see Figure 3) . In fact, λ is the first-best absorbing state, and there will be no further chance of liquidation once k t attains λ. Proposition 3. When γ = r , without loss of generality, we have k = λ. There exists a unique solution c (·) to Equation (4) with boundary conditions (5), (6), and (7), and the solution is strictly concave on [0, λ] .
Investors start the employment at W 0 = k * δ 0 , and let the agent's continuation payoff evolve according to Equation (11). If W t falls to zero, then investors liquidate the firm and fire the agent. However, once good fortune drives W t to attain λδ t , the agent receives cash payment dU s = λ (r − µ) δ s ds for s ≥ t, and, as an absorbing state, her continuation payoff W s stays at λδ s > 0 forever (so k s = λ from then on). Note that it is equivalent to granting λ (r − µ) shares to the agent, and these shares provide required incentives to motivate the agent.
We observe a key difference between our result and the one obtained in DS and BMPR who consider the impatient agent case only. Under their ABM setting, for however high the agent's continuation payoff, in any time interval, W t can reach the agent's fixed outside option R due to unbounded Brownian increments (check Equation (9)), and the marginal cost of setting a lower cash payment barrier W is always positive. In other words, in their ABM model the agent is always constrained, and there is always a gain from relaxing the constraint even further. 15 However, because the benefit of paying cash earlier is absent when γ = r , investors should postpone the agent's wage indefinitely, which renders the nonexistence of the optimal contract. 16 Under our GBM setup, because the firm's cash flows stay positive, we obtain an optimal contract with a first-best absorbing state k = λ in which the marginal cost of paying cash early is zero. In this state, the agent with enough equity shares works voluntarily, and future liquidation never occurs.
Note that most discrete-time agency models, including those in DF and BMPR, feature a first-best absorbing state in the optimal contract-as agency issue will be completely resolved once the agent's continuation payoff becomes sufficiently high. The driving forces, however, are different. For instance, in the binomial model in BMPR, given the time-step size, the per-period loss is bounded. Therefore, there exists an upper first-best absorbing state in which the firm accumulates a large fund whose interest is sufficient to cover all potential future losses. When the time-step size goes to zero as the cash-flow process converges to an ABM, this absorbing state explodes. In contrast, we derive a bounded absorbing state (λ) in the GBM model.
Discussion
: continuation payoff and inside stake. This section provides economic intuition for the optimal contract. We first discuss the optimal incentive provision policy, and, for simplicity, we focus on the equally patient agent case (γ = r ). The same argument applies to the γ > r case.
It is interesting to note that due to the time-varying firm size in the GBM framework, the agent's continuation payoff can generate a portion of incentives. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that at time t, investors decide to reward the agent with equity shares according to her continuation payoff. Note that the agent values α fraction of the firm as αδ t r −µ (given that she is working all the time). Therefore, to fulfill W t the agent is qualified to 15 In fact, the GBM model with positive cash flows also helps us disentangle the agency problem from the agent's limited-cash-reserve constraint. Note that in the ABM model, the costly termination is caused not only by the agent's moral hazard problem, but also by the fact that she only has a finitely "deep pocket." Specifically, even if the agent (given a fixed cash reserve) runs the firm as a proprietorship, unbounded cash flows-hence substantial losses-imply that future inefficient liquidation is always possible, and the probability of future liquidation is strictly decreasing in the level of the firm's cash reserve. Clearly, the latter differs from the inefficient punishment in the standard moral hazard literature.
16 To see this, we have Equation (9) under the ABM setting. Recall dU t ≥ 0; therefore for a loss d Z t < 0, W has to drop, and the size of the drop is independent of the level of W . This implies that within any time interval, there is always a positive probability for W to reach the termination boundary R. The higher the continuation payoff W , the lower the liquidation probability, and the higher the efficiency. It implies that the marginal cost of paying cash early is strictly positive. Given this fact, when γ = r so that there is zero benefit to pay the agent cash early, the optimal contract should accumulate W as high as possible to approach (but never reaches) the first-best outcome. In other words, any contract given a payment boundary W could be improved by setting W + 1 > W , and the wage payments are further delayed. Therefore in the limit dU t = 0 for 0 ≤ t < ∞, thus violating the Promise-Keeping condition (W t = 0 always; investors' promise about future wages is actually void). Note that Sannikov (2006b) imposes a fixed finite life span for the firm, therefore this issue is absent.
own α = (r − µ) k t shares of this firm (recall W t = k t δ t ), and these shares generate an instantaneous volatility of
17 By Proposition 1, when α ≥ α * ≡ λ (r − µ), or k t ≥ λ, these incentives are sufficient to motivate the agent. Because the agent's continuation payoff obtained from these shares remains positive, there is no future liquidation and the first-best outcome is achieved. Now, in the optimal contract, before reaching the absorbing state, the agent's scaled continuation payoff k t is always lower than λ. This implies that only α t = (r − µ) k t < α * shares can be awarded, if investors decide to do so. Also, as suggested by the optimal wage policy, investors should wait to reward the agent later (as dU = 0 before k t reaches λ). Are the incentives described above still present in this scenario? The answer is yes. Imagine that these "hypothetical" shares (which are held by investors at time t) are promised to be delivered at t + dt, so that the agent cannot receive any portion of current dividends δ t dt yet. Though hypothetical, these shares still generates incentives: because current dividends are in the lower order of dt, when firm size δ t diffuses, the value of these hypothetical shares exhibits the same volatility k t σδ t as actual shares.
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Loosely speaking, these hypothetical shares represent the agent's inside stake in the firm, but in a forward-looking sense. Finally, as required by Proposition 1, the optimal contract * imposes additional incentives (λ − k t ) σδ t to motivate the agent, and the above argument can be applied to any time s before k s attains λ.
We illustrate the idea in the previous paragraph graphically on the (δ, W ) plot in Figure 1 . Fix k; given W t = kδ t , the local movement of (δ t , kδ t ) is along a ray with slope k, due to the diffusion of δ t . In fact, this slope k just captures those incentives generated by the agent's hypothetical inside stake when the firm size δ t diffuses. The faster the firm grows, the higher the agent's continuation payoff, and the larger the incentives generated by these hypothetical shares.
In Section 2.1, we also observe that on the (δ, W ) plot, the incentive compatibility constraint requires a slope λ > k for the local movement of (δ t , W t ), and the agent will shirk if these hypothetical shares are the only incentive scheme available. Therefore, to implement working, investors have to provide additional incentives (λ − k) σδ t to fill out the slope gap λ − k, and these incentives constitute the diffusion term of dk t in Equation (8). Intuitively, these additional incentives are provided by promising larger future stock grants if her subsequent performance is superb, or liquidating the firm otherwise.
These observations lead to implications for the optimal wage policy. First, because the agent with α * inside shares works voluntarily, when γ = r (no relative consumption timing issue), it is the first-best absorbing state. Consequently, for the case of an equally patient agent, granting α * shares to the agent once W t reaches λδ t must be part of the optimal contract. Second, when the agent is less patient than investors (γ > r ), the first-best outcome not only avoids inefficient liquidation but also pays the agent as early as possible. Hence, it is never optimal for investors to wait until W t = λδ t to award the agent with α * shares. Accordingly, there exists a k < λ so that the firm starts paying wage once W t reaches kδ t . Both statements are exactly the optimal contracts derived in previous sections.
Justification for the optimal contract
Take any incentive-compatible contract = {{U } , τ}, and, for any t ≤ τ, define its auxiliary gain process {G} as
where the agent's continuation payoff W t evolves according to Equation (3). Under the optimal contract * , the associated optimal continuation payoff W * t has a volatility λσδ t , and
Now, let us verify that, under any ∈ IC, e rt dG t ( ) has a nonpositive drift, and zero drift for the optimal contract. The first and second lines are our Equation (4), which, under the optimal contract, is always zero. Because we have c (k t ) < 0 for k t < k, and since σ W t ≥ λσ holds for any ∈ IC, this term is nonpositive. The third line captures the optimality of the cash payment policy. It is nonpositive since c (k t ) ≥ −1, but equals zero under the optimal contract. Therefore, we have the following theorem. 
Extensions
Optimal contracting with costly replacements
As in DF and DS, in this section we endogenize the liquidation value (factor) L. Assume that the incumbent agent can be replaced with a new but identical agent. Replacement is costly (e.g., the entrenchment effect), and we formulate the cost as lδ t (where l is a positive constant) in order to capture the underlying size effect. The form of a pure variable cost retains the scale invariance of this model. The same analysis as in Section 2.2.1 goes through; the only difference is in the lower end boundary condition
which embeds the optimal replacement policy. We solve Equation (4) with conditions (5), (6), and (13), and obtain the endogenous liquidation value L as c (0). The optimal contract with replacement is analogous to the previous liquidation case. When the agent is impatient, the incumbent agent receives some wage whenever her continuation payoff W t exceeds kδ t , and the firm replaces her once W t falls to zero. In the equally patient agent case, poorly performing agents are fired, until a lucky one achieves k t = λ and henceforth continues to work for the firm forever.
Comparative static analyses. Here, we carry out comparative static analyses for the replacement case. (To find the corresponding results for the liquidation case, simply replace ∞ with the liquidation time τ * ; and the results for L are listed as well.) We also examine the comparative statics for optimal policiesnamely, the payment boundary k, and the replacement point k * . Two key conditions that we exploit here are c(k) = 1 r−µ − γ−µ r −µ k, and c (k * ) = 0. As in DS, Lemma 3 in the Appendix expresses the marginal impact of any parameter on c(k) in terms of the conditional expectation of a certain integral. Under the auxiliary measure induced by Equation (4), let {N t } be the counting process for replacements, 19 and define ) could have either sign. Finally, when γ = r , the results still hold except for those regarding k; recall that k = λ always in this case.
Most of the results are intuitive. For instance, we have ∂c(k)/∂σ < 0-as if investors were risk averse-because costly termination is more likely with a riskier project. This result also implies that ∂k/∂σ > 0, since investors should accumulate more continuation payoff along the optimal path in order to increase the buffer capacity. The same intuition applies to ∂k/∂l > 0.
A number of interesting empirical predictions ensue. For instance, the more severe the agency problem (higher σ or λ), the later the agent will receive incentive payouts (larger k). Also, for more profitable firms-with a higher µ-the new agent is offered more favorable terms (larger k * ), but will receive incentive payouts later (larger k). A larger k follows from the fact that investors 20 Here, we do not show comparative static results with respect to r, because most of them are ambiguous.
For instance, there are two offsetting effects on the payment boundary k. When r increases, the benefit from exchanging the relative consumption timings is smaller; investors should pay cash later, i.e., a larger k. However, the cost from future terminations is also reduced due to a larger discounting effect, which makes investors less worried about inefficient turnovers, and thus lowers k. As a result, the overall effect is ambiguous.
avert to costly liquidations of highly profitable projects, and therefore they set a higher payment boundary k to reduce the chance of future terminations. In other words, the working incentive must be lower than the level required by Proposition 1. For the auxiliary gain process {G} in Section 2.4 to remain a supermartingale given this policy, we need that
When is it optimal to
Equivalently, we can rewrite the above condition as
because investors can set σ W t = k t σ ≤ λσ in order to remove the negative second-order term. This interesting fact implies that under our GBM setup, although incentives are superfluous when shirking is allowed, the optimal incentive provision is k t σδ t , rather than zero as in the ABM framework. In fact, they are merely incentives generated by the agent's hypothetical inside stake as discussed in Section 2.3.3.
Similar to DS, based on Equation (14) we find the following sufficient condition for the optimality of working all the time:
DS also find that when the agent is impatient, if the shirking benefit φ is sufficiently high, then the contract with an absorbing shirking state is optimal. It transpires that for the equally patient agent case, this class of contracts is indeed optimal among all contracts that involve shirking along the history. . Therefore, Equation (14) implies that the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of working all the time is simply c φ r ≥ 1 r .
21 Note that in the γ > r case, if the scaled shirking benefit φ is only slightly higher than the level such that Equation (15) binds, then a more sophisticated contract will be optimal (see DS for detail).
Note that by "shirking all the time," the agent has a value φ r δ t , while investors obtain 1 r δ t . Hence, it is just the optimality condition of working at the state k = φ r . The interesting point is, this necessary condition is also sufficient for the optimality of implementing high effort at all states.
We can go one step further. Suppose that rc( Figure 4 -hence working all the time must be suboptimal. We show below that in the new optimal contract with shirking, ( Figure 4 shows one example of scaled value function with shirking c S (·), and the original scaled value function c (·). In this example, we assume that at termination, investors can either liquidate their assets at a surrender value Lδ t , or replace the agent at a cost lδ t . Clearly, the optimal termination policy depends on the relative magnitude of l and L. Interestingly, because shirking reduces the possibility of future terminations, the specific optimal termination policy might depend on whether or not the employment contract allows for shirking. Figure 4 demonstrates that due to a relatively large replacement cost l, the optimal contract with working all the time stipulates liquidation as the optimal termination policy; however, if shirking is allowed, replacement becomes optimal. This implies that in the absence of shirking, the optimal termination policy is liquidation, while when shirking is allowed on the optimal path, replacement becomes optimal.
Implementation and Applications
Implementation
To implement the optimal contract in Theorem 1, we design an Incentive Points Plan where the points trace the agent's scaled continuation payoff k t . Specifically, the agent starts with k * points when she is hired by the firm. From then on, this plan rewards the agent with incentive points according to
Once k t hits zero, she is fired. As featured by the payment boundary in the optimal contract, there is a redemption threshold k in this plan. When her points balance k t exceeds k, the agent can redeem k t − k points for (k t − k)δ t amount of cash from the firm.
22 Check dk t = d(W * t /δ t ). Note that this is under the physical measure (see discussion in note 14). Starting from k 0 , before k is regenerated (at 0) or regulated (at k), this linear SDE admits the solution k t = e κt−σZt [λσ
2 . This result is useful in simulating our model.
Performance-based stock grants. Now, focus on the case of an equally patient agent. As suggested by Section 2.3.3, when γ = r , the optimal contract can be easily implemented by the performance-based stock grants, where the firm initially puts α * = (r − µ) λ incentive shares in the treasury. Under the incentive points plan, once the agent accumulates sufficient points (k t = λ) after a long history of successes, she can redeem these points to obtain α * incentive shares, and receive her portion of dividends α * δ t dt onward. In contrast, following poor performance, the agent will be fired if she depletes all her points before receiving the stock grants.
Note that the performance-based stock grants are merely a variant of stock options, with a zero strike price, and a nonstandard exercise boundary.
23 Also, we require those equity shares to be restricted shares, a feature consistent with what we observe in practice. In fact, our implementation resembles "performance shares" or "rights" in the long-term incentive plans of today's corporations. 4.1.1 Implications. There are several implications that follow from the evolution of the scaled continuation payoff k in Equation (16). The incentive points, which track the agent's scaled continuation payoff, have a positive drift that is increasing in the level of k t . This indicates the positive feedback effect of the agent's performance on her future cash payouts. This effect also shows up in the probability of the agent's future layoff: the higher the incentive points' balance, the larger the drift, and also the lower the volatility of k t . As discussed in Section 2.3.3, less "additional" incentives are needed when the agent's continuation payoff is higher.
Second, in this model the agent's scaled continuation payoff k t measures the extent of the firm's agency problem. Because k t comoves positively with firm size growth, cross-sectionally we expect that agency issues will tend to be more severe in small firms. Note that the aforementioned positive feedback effect in this model could potentially amplify this divergence. If, in addition, the firm's value affects the firm's investment policy (not modeled here), 25 then this amplification mechanism can be strengthened even further. Future work on this cross-sectional divergence is worth pursuing.
Can we have similar implementations as in DS or BMPR?
We do not propose implementations that are similar to those in DS or BMPR. In their papers, a fund balance, which evolves according to the firm's cash flows, keeps track of the agent's continuation payoff. For instance, in DS, the combination of long-term debt, equity, and credit line implements the optimal contract, and the credit line balance traces the agent's continuation payoff.
In our GBM model, however, the agent's continuation payoff cannot be linked to actual cash flows. This difference is rooted in the fundamental control equation. In their model, the agent controls the cash flow dY t , hence their optimal contract can use dY t to trace the agent's continuation payoff. In our model, however, the agent controls dδ t , which is the change of firm size rather than the predetermined cash flow δ t dt. This implies that our optimal contract has to rely upon dδ t to keep track of the agent's continuation payoff, and thus cannot be implemented by standard cash-flow contracts (e.g., credit lines) in which only δ t dt matters.
Applications 4.2.1 Financial distress and the leverage effect.
In our model, during financial distress the firm's equity return becomes more volatile: the well-known leverage effect. To study the equity return, we first exclude the agent's nontradable stake. To accommodate corporate debt within our setting, we assume that the firm maintains a short-term debt ρδ t outstanding, where 0
That is to say, the firm simply rolls over and adjusts this amount of riskless short-term debt according to the firm size. Therefore, the equity value is (c(k t ) − ρ)δ t . Note that without agency problems, the presence of such short-term riskless debt does not affect the constant volatility of equity return (the equity value is ( 1 r−µ − ρ)δ t ). Now, under the agency problem, one can verify that the instantaneous equity return is
The drift term comprises three parts: (i) discount rate r ; (ii) dividend payout rate 1−ρr c(k t )−ρ ; and (iii) stock repurchase rate for new debt
The diffusion term exhibits a stochastic volatility, and the volatility rises when k → 0, as the firm is on the verge of liquidation. BMPR also derive the leverageeffect result under the ABM framework. However, without the agency problem, the GBM setting would result in constant volatility for the return, as opposed to the level in the ABM framework. Therefore, our predicted leverage effect is more compelling than the one obtained in BMPR.
4.2.2
Executive's pay-performance sensitivity. Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that a CEO obtains only $3.25 per $1,000 increase in the shareholders' wealth; in the authors' terminology, this constitutes the sensitivity of CEO's "expected wealth" on his or her performance. Interestingly, the concept of expected wealth in Jensen and Murphy (1990) captures an idea similar to the continuation payoff in this paper. 26 However, by considering only the instant compensation (cash or new grants) and the capital gains from existing inside shares and options, most of the current empirical literature on CEO compensation might understate the long-term incentives generated by the continuation payoff in executives' remuneration contracts.
27
What might be missing in the ongoing empirical work? To illustrate the importance of continuation payoff in measuring executive pay-performance responsiveness, we first simulate our model for the γ = r case. The optimal contract is implemented by the performance-based stock grants. We choose r = 4%, µ = 0.5%, σ 2 = 6.25% to match the calibration in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) , and set l = 0.2 and λ = 0.18. 28 We set ρ = 10 to have a debt ratio of about 35%. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990) , we perform the following OLS regression:
where Comp i,t includes the grants value, dividends, and capital gains, and S i,t is the change of shareholders' wealth (including dividends). We find that the mean (standard deviation) of β 0 is 0.40% (0.047%), and the mean (standard deviation) of β 1 is 0.12% (0.028%). Therefore, the estimated sensitivity is 0.51% (0.40% + 0.12% × e −0.04 ); this is about 15% lower than the theoretical value (r − µ) λ = 0.63%, which takes into account the continuation payoff.
Two reasons may exist for researchers showing little concern about this issue. First, in pay-performance regressions, Jensen and Murphy (1990); and Joskow and Rose (1994) find that the higher order lagged performances display insignificant coefficients. Second, long-term observations of firm-CEO pairs are not easily available.
30 However, our model advocates that we focus on 1 r −µ = 28.57, the replacement cost is about 0.7% of the firm value, and the first-best inside holding (r − µ)λ is circa 0.6% to match the median CEO pay-performance measure obtained in Hall and Liebman (1998) . 29 There are 10 years and 200 firms in each simulation (with simulating time interval 0.01, or 3.65 days), and we repeat it 500 times. Each firm's performance is driven by an independent Brownian motion. The regression is performed on annual data. 30 Based on a VAR analysis, Boschen and Smith (1995) study the dynamic responses of executive's performance today on their future compensation. However, the time-series regression could overlap from one CEO to another, violating the underlying assumption of a long-term agency model in which the same agent stays in the contractual relationship.
the stock and option grants when measuring the dynamic pay-performance relationship. In addition, as these grants have been growing dramatically in large companies since the late 1980s (Hall and Liebman, 1998) , we expect more pronounced results from recent years. 
Grants
We combine the restricted stock and option grants together as our dependent variable Grants i,t (in thousands, and Grants i,t = max(Grants * i,t , 0)), which is the value of total grants received by CEO i at year t. The independent variables S i,t− j 's are the changes of the shareholders' wealth (in millions) of firm i at year t − j. We add years served by the CEO (not reported here) to control for possible "promised" compensations in remuneration contracts. Due to the units difference between Grants and S, the coefficients for S (with standard deviation underneath) measure the dollar change of the agent's grants value given a $1,000 change in the company's equity value.
A number of interesting findings arise from the above regression. First, the coefficient for contemporaneous performance is dominated by those for the CEO's past performances, showing that the CEO's grants are primarily driven by his or her historical achievements. Second, in contrast to Jensen and Murphy (1990); and Joskow and Rose (1994) , all coefficients are significant, and even increase with lags.
32 Their magnitudes, however, are quite small. For instance, for a discount rate r = 4%, the total incentives from current and future grants are, at most, $0.868 for a $1,000 change of shareholders' wealth. 33 This weak result might be due to our simple econometric specification (see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) . 31 We use the ExecuComp data set in Compustat, which covers S&P 500 companies from 1992 to 2004. We use only the CEO data, and all numbers are adjusted in terms of 1992 dollars. The five-consecutive-year restriction on service results in 5,040 CEO-year observations. We estimate Tobit regression because there are 1,051 observations with zero total grants. We compute S i,t by multiplying T RS1Y R/100 and the company's market value in the previous year. The four-lag structure is chosen to match the median serving years of CEOs. To calculate the CEO's tenure, we count back to 1992, or the first year (after 1992) when the manager became CEO.
32 Note that our model implies that prior lags should have larger impacts due to the discount effect. For instance, the agent who was working at t − 4 should discount the time-t compensation β 4 , while β 0 compensation is in today's dollars.
33 0.0913 + 0.2076 × e −0.04 + 0.1608 × e −0.08 + 0.2420 × e −0.12 + 0.2516 × e −0.16 = 0.868. There is a slight overestimation due to the Tobit model structure. Note that Jensen and Murphy (1990) find a CEO pay-performance sensitivity measure (mostly driven by inside shareholdings) as $3.15/$1,000.
Concluding Remarks
We study optimal contracting in a GBM firm size setting. In this model, growing firm size-as the agent's positive performance-increases the agent's inside stake within the firm, and thereby alleviates the agency problem. Along the optimal path, the agent requires stronger incentives than those she would have by holding equity according to her inside stake. Such incentives can be provided by future performance-based stock grants, and they implement the optimal contract when the agent is as patient as investors. In this case, if it is too costly to work all the time, we further derive a new optimal contract that features two absorbing states along the optimal path: one is shirking forever, and the other is working forever.
Distinct from the existing ABM model (BS and BMPR), which only studies the case of an impatient agent, under the GBM setup we derive an optimal contract with a first-best absorbing state for the case of an equally patient agent. Also, a time-varying firm size in the GBM model highlights the connection between the agent's continuation payoff and her inside stake in the firm, which provides a better understanding of the optimal incentive provision in dynamic contracting. These interesting findings advance the current continuous-time contracting literature. This paper initiates the first step to connect recent research on dynamic contracting with the conventional continuous-time finance literature. This line of research awaits future work; for instance, it would be interesting to incorporate systematic agency-issue-related shocks into this framework. Also, this paper enables us to draw several insights for empirical studies on CEO's pay-performance relations. Empirical results provide support to our model, which predicts that for stock/option grants, past performance is of greater importance than contemporaneous performance. This suggests that today's executive remuneration contracts should be analyzed from a dynamic perspective.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 in Section 2.1 Given any contract = {{U }, τ}, define the process V t ≡ E t [ τ 0 e −γs dU s ] for t ∈ [0, τ) as the value process of the agent's discounted wages. Under condition (1), {V t : 0 ≤ t < τ} forms a square-integrable martingale until τ. According to the Martingale Representation Theorem, there exists a progressively measurable process {σ W t : 0 ≤ t < τ} s.t.
Hence under the presumption {a t = µ : 0 ≤ t < τ}, we have 
If σ W t ≥ λσ, then it has a nonpositive drift, and is a martingale if {a t = µ : 0 ≤ t < τ}. If there is a positive probability event that σ W t < λσ during [0, τ), the agent will deviate to a t = 0, and 
where b i and b i j denote the first-and second-order partial derivatives, respectively. Immediately we see that the optimal wage policy satisfies dU t = 0 when
, and δb 11 = −δkb 12 = δk 2 b 22 = k 2 c (k). 
Lemma 1. Suppose that k t evolves according to dk t
with boundary conditions F (0) = L and F k = −θ, if and only if it satisfies 
If k t evolves according to dk t
Proof. The proof is similar to DS Lemma D. The result with jumps is a simple extension.
A Lemma for the Homogenous Version of Equation (4)
The following lemma is repeatedly used in our later proofs.
Lemma 2. Suppose f (·) ∈ C 2 [0, k] where k ≤ λ, and it satisfies
that c(·; k 1 ) and c(; k 2 ) solves Equation (4) while taking k 1 < k 2 as upper boundaries respectively, and define 
Proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2.4
Under any incentive-compatible contract, for the auxiliary gain process we have r−µ < ∞, the payoff G is well defined. Then, given any t < ∞,
The first term of third inequality follows from the negative drift of dG t ( ) and the martingale property of → 0 as t → ∞, we have G ≤ G 0 for all ∈ IC. Finally, under the optimal contract * , the investors' payoff G( * ) achieves G 0 because the above weak inequality holds in equality when t → ∞.
Proofs for Comparative Static Results in Section 3.1
We provide the lemma only for the replacement case. The liquidation case is immediate (see DS).
Lemma 3. For θ ∈ r, γ, µ, l, λ, σ 2 , denote by c θ (k) the scaled value function for that parameter value. We have
Proof. The proof is similar to DS Lemma F. Given a policy P ≡(k, k * ) that simply sends out cash at k and replaces a new agent back to k * , the investors' payoff c θ (k; P) must solve the ODE
with boundary conditions c θ (k; P) = −1 and c θ (k * ; P) − c θ (0; P) = l. Note that both conditions are independent of P. It follows that ∂ ∂θ c θ (k; P) = 0 and ∂ ∂θ [c θ (k * ; P) − c θ (0; P)] = ∂l ∂θ for any feasible P (so does the optimal policy). Denote P(θ) as the optimal policy under θ; then by definition c θ (k) = c θ (k; P(θ)). Differentiate both sides of Equation (A2) with respect to θ and evaluate at P = P (θ),
with boundary conditions Proof. For (1) we use two facts. First, Q(k) is the time-discounting average of f (k t ) under the measure induced by k 0 = k. Second, for k 1 > k 2 where k 1 ≥ k * , it must be true that f (k 1 ) > f (k 2 ). According to Lemma 1, Q must solve the following second-order ODE:
with boundary conditions Q(0) = Q(k * ) and Q (k) = 0. We first show Q (k − ) > 0 for small > 0. To see this, if k < λ, then since r Q(k) = r f (k) + (λ−k) 2 σ 2 2 Q (k) and f (k) is the maximum, we have Q (k) < 0. If k = λ, Q(λ) = f (λ) (as λ is the absorbing state) reaches the unique maximum, therefore Q (λ − ) < 0. Suppose Q (x) < 0 for some x ∈ [k * , k), then there must be a point y > x such that Q (y) = 0, Q (y) > 0, and Q is decreasing on (x, y). (y is the locally minimum point closest to x). We know then r Q(y) = r f (y) + (λ−k) 2 σ 2 2 Q (y), so Q(y) > f (y). Now focus on [0, y], which contains k * . We claim that Q(·) must be convex on [0, y] . To see this, suppose we can find a reflecting point (closest to y) z < y satisfying Q (z) = 0, Q (z) < 0, and it must be the case that Q(z) > Q(y). However, we have r Q(z) = r f (z) + βk Q (z) < r f (z). Combining with the result Q(y) > f (y), we have f (z) > f (y) with z < y and y ≥ k * , contradiction. But if Q(·) is convex on [0, y], then Q < 0 on (x, y) implies that Q < 0 on (0, y), contradicting the boundary condition Q(0) = Q(k * ). Hence the original counterfactual assumption of the existence of x s.t. Q (x) < 0 does not hold, and the conclusion follows.
For (2), it is the extreme case of (1) (with k * = 0 and f as a Dirac delta function with the support {0}), and the results directly follow from Lemma 2. When k = λ, Q(λ) = 0 as k = λ is absorbing state and the probability to return to [0, λ) is zero.
For (3), let P(k; k) ≡ Q 2 (k; k). Note that it is different from differentiating w.r.t. parameter as we do in Lemma 3: we are now differentiating w.r.t policy. We still have that P(k; k) solves r P(k; k) = βk P 1 (k; k) + (λ−k) 2 σ 2 2 P 11 (k; k), with condition P(k * ; k) − P(0; k) = 0, where P i and P i j denote partial derivatives (similarly for Q i and Q i j ). To use Lemma 1, we have to pin down P 1 (k; k) = Q 12 (k; k). In fact, because Q 1 (k; k) = 0 for all k, 0 = d dk Q 1 (k; k) = Q 11 (k; k) + Q 12 (k; k). Hence invoking the result in lemma 1, we find that P(k; k) = −Q 11 (k; k)E k 0 =k { ∞ 0 e −rt du t } ≤ 0 because Q is convex in k (note that E k 0 =k { ∞ 0 e −rt du t } > 0). When k < λ, using Q(k, k) > 0 and Q 1 (k, k) = 0, we find that Equation (A3) yields Q 11 (k; k) > 0.
When k = λ, Equation (A3) (with f = 0) is an ODE with an essential (irregular) singularity at λ. Our goal is to show that when k = λ, Q (λ) = 0. We first show that Q (λ−) = 0, as the main concern is the explosion of Q near singularity. First, notice that Q (k) must be bounded in the vicinity of λ. Otherwise, because Q ≥ 0, we can always find a point λ − ε such that Q (λ − ε) > 0, Q (λ − ε) > B where ε is small enough and B is large enough. Then differentiating Equation (A3) at λ − ε, we observe that the term involving Q is greater than (β(λ − ε) − εσ 2 )B > 0 and (r − β)Q is bounded (note the fact that Q(0) − Q(k * ) = 1 and Q is convex implies (r − β)Q (λ − ε) < (r − β)Q (k * ) < β−r k * ), and a contradiction follows. Now the mean-value-theorem argument similar to the proof of Proposition 2 shows that Q (λ−) = 0. Finally, because it is easy to show Q (λ−) = 0, Q (λ) = lim 
